

111TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 375

To enhance the security of the Western Hemisphere and bolster regional capacity and cooperation to counter current and emerging threats, to promote cooperation in the Western Hemisphere to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, to secure universal adherence to agreements regarding nuclear nonproliferation, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 9, 2009

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN (for herself, Mr. BURTON of Indiana, and Mr. MACK) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

A BILL

To enhance the security of the Western Hemisphere and bolster regional capacity and cooperation to counter current and emerging threats, to promote cooperation in the Western Hemisphere to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, to secure universal adherence to agreements regarding nuclear nonproliferation, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

1 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; DEFINITIONS; TABLE OF CON-**
2 **TENTS.**

3 (a) **SHORT TITLE.**—This Act may be cited as the
4 “Western Hemisphere Counterterrorism and Non-
5 proliferation Act of 2009”.

6 (b) **DEFINITIONS.**—In this Act:

7 (1) **APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-**
8 **TEES.**—The term “appropriate congressional com-
9 mittees” means—

10 (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and
11 the Committee on Homeland Security of the
12 House of Representatives; and

13 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations
14 and the Committee on Homeland Security and
15 Governmental Affairs of the Senate.

16 (2) **NONHUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE.**—The
17 term “nonhumanitarian assistance” means—

18 (A) any assistance under the Foreign As-
19 sistance Act of 1961 (including programs under
20 title IV of chapter 2 of part I of such Act, re-
21 lating to the Overseas Private Investment Cor-
22 poration), other than—

23 (i) disaster relief assistance, including
24 any assistance under chapter 9 of part I of
25 such Act;

1 (ii) assistance which involves the pro-
 2 vision of food (including monetization of
 3 food) or medicine; and

4 (iii) assistance for refugees;

5 (B) sales, or financing on any terms, under
 6 the Arms Export Control Act; and

7 (C) financing under the Export-Import
 8 Bank Act of 1945.

9 (3) STATE SPONSOR OF TERRORISM.—The term
 10 “state sponsor of terrorism” means a country the
 11 government of which has been determined by the
 12 Secretary of State, for purposes of section 6(j) of
 13 the Export Administration Act of 1979, section
 14 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, section
 15 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, or other provi-
 16 sion of law, is a government that has repeatedly pro-
 17 vided support for acts of international terrorism.

18 (c) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for
 19 this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; definitions; table of contents.

TITLE I—COUNTERTERRORISM IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Sec. 101. Findings.

Sec. 102. Statement of policy regarding regional efforts to counter terrorism in
 the Western Hemisphere.

Sec. 103. Amendments to annual country reports on terrorism.

Sec. 104. Amendments to annual determination procedures.

Sec. 105. Amendment to international narcotics control strategy report.

Sec. 106. United States efforts in the Western Hemisphere.

Sec. 107. International Law Enforcement Academy in San Salvador, El Sal-
 vador.

Sec. 108. Actions regarding the Organization of American States.

Sec. 109. Amendment to Department of State Rewards Program.

TITLE II—NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Sec. 201. Findings.

Sec. 202. Statement of policy regarding the proliferation of weapons-related nuclear, chemical, and biological materials, technology, and facilities.

Sec. 203. Statement of policy regarding the small quantities protocol.

Sec. 204. Securing adherence to agreements regarding nuclear nonproliferation by countries in the Western Hemisphere.

Sec. 205. Halting the proliferation of nuclear fuel fabrication.

Sec. 206. Cooperation with the Proliferation Security Initiative.

Sec. 207. Establishment of the Western Hemisphere Nonproliferation Partnership Initiative.

Sec. 208. Prohibited transactions.

Sec. 209. Restrictions on nuclear cooperation with countries assisting the nuclear program of Venezuela or Cuba.

TITLE III—WESTERN HEMISPHERE REGIONAL COORDINATION
CENTERS

Sec. 301. Establishment of the Western Hemisphere Regional Coordination Centers.

Sec. 302. Regional Security Initiative.

Sec. 303. Authorization of appropriations.

TITLE IV—PROHIBITIONS ON ENGAGEMENT WITH CERTAIN
WESTERN HEMISPHERE COUNTRIES

Sec. 401. Prohibitions on engagement with certain Western Hemisphere countries.

TITLE V—REPORT

Sec. 501. Report.

1 TITLE I—COUNTERTERRORISM
2 IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

3 SEC. 101. FINDINGS.

4 Congress finds the following:

5 (1) In 2004, a Lebanese individual, having entered the United States illegally from Mexico, was
6 charged with supporting Hezbollah financially and
7 was described by the United States Attorney as a
8 “fighter, recruiter and fundraiser”.
9

1 (2) In December 2006, the Department of the
2 Treasury designated nine individuals and two enti-
3 ties as part of a network that is “a major financial
4 artery to Hezbollah in Lebanon” and announced an
5 effort to target Hezbollah fundraising in the tri-bor-
6 der area of Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay.

7 (3) In 2007, the Chavez regime established rou-
8 tine civilian airline flights between Venezuela and
9 designated State Sponsors of Terrorism, Iran, and
10 Syria.

11 (4) In October 2007, Secretary of Homeland
12 Security Michael Chertoff said, in response to a
13 question about relations between Iran and Ven-
14 ezuela, “I think [there is] an emerging threat and
15 challenge to the West, which is the export of ide-
16 ology that we see among Islamist extremists in the
17 Middle East from Iran, and the marriage of that
18 with others who, perhaps for their own reasons, have
19 strong anti-American views or who simply exploit
20 anti-Americanism as a way of promoting their own
21 ideological or power agendas.”.

22 (5) In November 2007, Interpol’s General As-
23 sembly agreed to issue red capture notices for the
24 arrest of a Hezbollah leader and five former senior
25 Iranian officials charged by Argentina in the 1994

1 Argentine Mutual Jewish Association (AMIA) ter-
2 rorist attack, in which 85 innocent people were killed
3 and 300 more were wounded.

4 (6) A 2007 Drug Enforcement Administration
5 report linked nearly half of foreign terrorist organi-
6 zations around the world today to narcotics trade,
7 underscoring the fact that the fight against ter-
8 rorism must also include a corresponding fight
9 against illicit drugs.

10 (7) In February 2008, Director of National In-
11 telligence Mike McConnell reported to Congress in
12 his presentation of the Intelligence Community's An-
13 nual Threat Assessment that the governments of Ec-
14 uador, Nicaragua, and Bolivia, "to varying degrees,
15 have engaged in sharply anti-U.S. rhetoric, aligned
16 with Venezuela and Cuba—and increasingly Iran—
17 on international issues, and advocated measures that
18 directly clash with U.S. initiatives".

19 (8) In February 2008, a United States Federal
20 law-enforcement official shared, "We've known for
21 some time that Islamic extremists groups were gain-
22 ing momentum and exploiting the region . . . Iran
23 is no exception—now with Cuba and Venezuela, the
24 door is open."

1 (9) Venezuela has concluded nearly 200 bilat-
2 eral agreements with Iran on military cooperation,
3 the sharing of intelligence, expanding financial co-
4 operation, and initiating cultural exchanges, among
5 others.

6 (10) According to United States intelligence of-
7 ficials, Iran possesses the potential to use its close
8 relationship with Venezuela to facilitate the smug-
9 gling of people, drugs, and weapons into the West-
10 ern Hemisphere through terrorist proxy groups.

11 (11) In March 2008, the Colombian army led a
12 raid against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Co-
13 lombia and seized computers containing documents
14 that suggest evidence of \$300,000,000 in payments
15 to the extremist organization from the Venezuelan
16 Government, high-level contacts by the FARC with
17 officials from Ecuador and Venezuela, and efforts by
18 the FARC to obtain 50 kilograms of uranium.

19 (12) The Inter-American Convention Against
20 Terrorism of the Organization of American States
21 commits all State parties to establish domestic regu-
22 latory institutions that eradicate the financing of
23 terrorist offenses, cooperate with fellow signatories
24 to control borders, provide mutual legal assistance in
25 counterterrorism efforts and prosecution of terrorist

1 offenses, and conform to all other stipulations of the
2 convention designed to prevent, punish, and elimi-
3 nate terrorist offenses.

4 (13) In June 2008, the Department of the
5 Treasury designated two Venezuela-based supporters
6 of Hizballah, Ghazi Nasr al Din and Fawzi Kan'an,
7 along with two travel agencies owned and controlled
8 by Kan'an, explaining it is "extremely troubling to
9 see the Government of Venezuela employing and
10 providing safe harbor to Hizballah facilitators and
11 fundraisers."

12 (14) In May 2008, for the third year in a row,
13 the Department of State determined, pursuant to
14 section 40A of the Arms Export Control Act, that
15 Venezuela was not cooperating fully with United
16 States antiterrorism efforts.

17 (15) In April 2008, for the fourth year in a row,
18 the Department of State's Annual Country Report
19 on Terrorism stated that the Government of Cuba
20 provided safe haven to members of [several Latin
21 American terrorist groups] and maintained close re-
22 lationships with other state sponsors of terrorism
23 such as Iran.

24 (16) In April 2008, for the fifth year in a row,
25 the Department of State's Annual Country Report

1 on Terrorism also noted that Venezuelan citizenship,
2 identity, and travel documents remain easy to ob-
3 tain, making Venezuela a potentially attractive way-
4 station for terrorists.

5 (17) August to December 2008 marked a resur-
6 gence in deadly attacks by the Shining Path, a De-
7 partment of State-designated foreign terrorist orga-
8 nization, in Peru. Peruvian security officials say that
9 while the group's numbers have dwindled, its arsenal
10 is stronger than in the past, as profits from the drug
11 trade allow it to buy more powerful weapons.

12 (18) In October 2008, reports surfaced that the
13 Chavez government, with help from Cuban military
14 advisors and FARC guerrillas, was allegedly oper-
15 ating a secret paramilitary training camp in a
16 closed-off tourist campground in Venezuela.

17 (19) In October 2008, the Department of the
18 Treasury designated Banco Internacional de
19 Desarrollo, C.A., a financial institution located in
20 Venezuela, to be owned or controlled by or acting or
21 purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or in-
22 directly, the Export Development Bank of Iran
23 (EDBI). EDBI was designated for its role in help-
24 ing Iran violate United Nations sanctions and han-
25 dle its illicit transactions.

1 (20) In December 2008, media sources reported
2 that Iran is using its close ties with Venezuela to
3 dodge United Nations sanctions by using aircraft
4 from Venezuelan airline Conviasa to transport com-
5 puters and engine components to Syria for use in
6 missiles.

7 **SEC. 102. STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING REGIONAL**
8 **EFFORTS TO COUNTER TERRORISM IN THE**
9 **WESTERN HEMISPHERE.**

10 To enhance the security of the Western Hemisphere
11 and bolster regional capacity to counter terrorism, it shall
12 be the policy of the United States to promote the signing,
13 ratification, and implementation by all countries in the
14 Western Hemisphere of the following:

15 (1) OAS AG/RES. 1840 (XXXII-O/02) Inter-
16 American Convention Against Terrorism.

17 (2) Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 40
18 Recommendations on Money Laundering (ML) and
19 9 Special Recommendations (SR) on Terrorist Fi-
20 nancing (TF).

21 (3) The 1963 ICAO Convention on Offences
22 and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Air-
23 craft.

24 (4) The 1970 ICAO Convention for the Sup-
25 pression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft.

1 (5) The 1971 ICAO Convention for the Sup-
2 pression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil
3 Aviation.

4 (6) The 1973 United Nations Convention on
5 the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against
6 Internationally Protected Person, including Diplo-
7 matic Agents.

8 (7) The 1979 United Nations International
9 Convention Against the Taking of Hostages.

10 (8) The 1988 ICAO Protocol for the Suppres-
11 sion of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serv-
12 ing International Civil Aviation, Supplementary to
13 the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
14 Against the Safety of Civil Aviation.

15 (9) The 1988 IMO Convention for the Suppres-
16 sion of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Mari-
17 time Navigation.

18 (10) The 1988 IMO Protocol for the Suppres-
19 sion of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed
20 Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf.

21 (11) The 1991 ICAO Convention on the Mark-
22 ing of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detec-
23 tion.

1 (12) The 1997 United Nations International
2 Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bomb-
3 ings.

4 (13) The 1999 United Nations International
5 Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
6 Terrorism.

7 (14) The 2001 United Nations S/Res/1373 Cre-
8 ation of Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC).

9 (15) The 2005 United Nations S/Res/1624 Pro-
10 hibition of incitement to commit terrorist act or
11 acts.

12 **SEC. 103. AMENDMENTS TO ANNUAL COUNTRY REPORTS**
13 **ON TERRORISM.**

14 Section 140(b) of the Foreign Relations Authoriza-
15 tion Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C.
16 2656f(b)) is amended—

17 (1) in paragraph (4)(D), by striking “and” at
18 the end;

19 (2) in paragraph (5), by striking the period at
20 the end and inserting “; and”;

21 (3) by redesignating the second paragraph (3)
22 and the second paragraph (4) as paragraphs (6) and
23 (7), respectively;

24 (4) in paragraph (6), as so redesignated, by
25 striking “and” at the end;

1 (5) in paragraph (7), as so redesignated, by
 2 striking the period at the end; and

3 (6) by adding after such paragraph (7) the fol-
 4 lowing new paragraphs:

5 “(8) a comprehensive assessment of all United
 6 States assistance available to combat terrorism in
 7 each country that is a subject of such report; and

8 “(9) with respect to countries in the Western
 9 Hemisphere that are the subjects of such report, the
 10 level in each such country of threat posed by radical
 11 Islamist terrorism.”.

12 **SEC. 104. AMENDMENTS TO ANNUAL DETERMINATION PRO-**
 13 **CEDURES.**

14 Section 706 of the Foreign Relations Authorization
 15 Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107–228; 22 U.S.C.
 16 2291j–1) is amended—

17 (1) in paragraph (2)—

18 (A) in subparagraph (A)(ii); by striking
 19 “and” at the end;

20 (B) by redesignating subparagraph (B) as
 21 subparagraph (C);

22 (C) by inserting after subparagraph (A)
 23 the following new subparagraph:

24 “(B) designate each country, if any, identi-
 25 fied in such report in which a link has been de-

1 terminated to exist between illicit drug trafficking
2 and a designated foreign terrorist organization
3 and that has failed demonstrably, during the
4 previous 12 months, to make substantial ef-
5 forts—

6 “(i) to adhere to its obligations under
7 international counterterrorism agreements;
8 and

9 “(ii) to implement effective counter-
10 terrorism measures, including action on
11 such issues as the rule of law, denying safe
12 haven to terrorists, financing and money
13 laundering, and law enforcement; and”;
14 and

15 (D) in subparagraph (C), as so redesign-
16 nated, by inserting before the period at the end
17 the following: “under subparagraph (A) or
18 (B)”;

19 (2) in paragraph (3)—

20 (A) in subparagraph (A), by striking “or”
21 at the end;

22 (B) in subparagraph (B)(2), by striking
23 the period at the end and inserting “; or”; and

24 (C) by adding at the end the following new
25 subparagraph:

1 “(C) subsequent to the designation being
2 made under paragraph (2)(B), the country has
3 made substantial efforts—

4 “(i) to adhere to its obligations under
5 international counterterrorism agreements;
6 and

7 “(ii) to implement effective counter-
8 terrorism measures, including action on
9 such issues as the rule of law, denying safe
10 haven to terrorists, financing and money
11 laundering, and law enforcement.”;

12 (3) by redesignating paragraph (8) as para-
13 graph (9); and

14 (4) by inserting after paragraph (7) the fol-
15 lowing new paragraph:

16 “(8) BILATERAL AGREEMENTS.—If a country
17 designated under subparagraphs (A) and (B) of
18 paragraph (2) does not receive a determination
19 under subparagraphs (B) or (C) of paragraph (3),
20 the Secretary of State shall negotiate with such
21 country a bilateral agreement describing actions to
22 be taken by the United States and such country to
23 satisfy such determinations during the one year pe-
24 riod following such a designation. Such a bilateral
25 agreement should include a needs assessment, a bi-

1 lateral action plan, the provision of United States
 2 training and assistance, the use of International
 3 Law Enforcement Academy facilities in the region,
 4 and an exchange of model laws and best practices.”.

5 **SEC. 105. AMENDMENT TO INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS**
 6 **CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT.**

7 Section 489(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
 8 (22 U.S.C. 2291h(a)) is amended by adding at the end
 9 the following new paragraph:

10 “(9) A separate section that contains informa-
 11 tion relating to any links between illicit narcotics
 12 trafficking or money laundering and terrorists, ter-
 13 rorist acts, or designated foreign terrorist organiza-
 14 tions (as such term is used in section 219 of the Im-
 15 migration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189)),
 16 and any actions taken by the United States Govern-
 17 ment or foreign government to address such links.”.

18 **SEC. 106. UNITED STATES EFFORTS IN THE WESTERN**
 19 **HEMISPHERE.**

20 (a) DETERMINATION.—For any country in the West-
 21 ern Hemisphere that the President has determined—

22 (1) is engaged in military cooperation with a
 23 state sponsor of terrorism,

24 (2) is engaged in nonmarket-based trade with a
 25 state sponsor of terrorism,

1 (3) is carrying out policies that threaten United
2 States national security interests, or

3 (4) is not fully cooperating with United States
4 counterterrorism or nonproliferation efforts,
5 the President is authorized to impose any of the sanctions
6 described in subsection (b).

7 (b) SANCTIONS.—For any country in the Western
8 Hemisphere with respect to which the President has made
9 a determination in accordance with subsection (a), the
10 President is authorized to—

11 (1) suspend United States nonhumanitarian
12 foreign assistance to the government of that country;
13 and

14 (2) prohibit the sale, provision, or transfer of
15 articles, including the issuance of any specific license
16 or grant of any other specific permission or author-
17 ity to export any goods or technology under—

18 (A) the Export Administration Act of
19 1979;

20 (B) the Arms Export Control Act;

21 (C) the Atomic Energy Act of 1954; or

22 (D) any other statute that requires the
23 prior review and approval of the United States
24 Government as a condition for the export or re-
25 export of goods or services.

1 **SEC. 107. INTERNATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT ACADEMY**
2 **IN SAN SALVADOR, EL SALVADOR.**

3 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
4 gress that the International Law Enforcement Academy
5 (ILEA) in San Salvador, El Salvador, should continue to
6 serve as a critical component of United States regional
7 counterterrorism efforts.

8 (b) NEGOTIATION.—The Secretary of State shall ne-
9 gotiate with the appropriate agency entities to ensure that
10 counterterrorism, including radical Islamist extremism
11 within the Western Hemisphere, nonproliferation, and
12 border security courses are instituted as part of the core
13 curriculum at the International Law Enforcement Acad-
14 emy in San Salvador.

15 (c) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There
16 are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be
17 necessary to—

18 (1) complete all physical aspects of the ILEA
19 facility in San Salvador; and

20 (2) implement the ILEA Global Network.

21 **SEC. 108. ACTIONS REGARDING THE ORGANIZATION OF**
22 **AMERICAN STATES.**

23 (a) DECLARATION REGARDING TERRORISM.—The
24 Secretary of State shall direct the United States Rep-
25 resentative to the Organization of American States (OAS)
26 to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States

1 at the OAS to move for a declaration at the first meeting
2 of Member States of the OAS convened after the date of
3 the enactment of this Act calling on countries to system-
4 atically deny the use of their territories by terrorists or
5 terrorist organizations.

6 (b) REDUCTION IN UNITED STATES CONTRIBU-
7 TION.—

8 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall
9 reduce by 50 percent the amount of the United
10 States assessed contribution to the OAS for fiscal
11 year 2009 and each subsequent fiscal year.

12 (2) USE OF FUNDS.—

13 (A) IN GENERAL.—Of the amount reduced
14 pursuant to paragraph (1), not less than ten
15 percent of such amount shall be added to
16 United States voluntary contributions to each
17 of the organizations specified in subparagraph
18 (B) and the remaining amount shall be used to
19 establish and maintain the Western Hemisphere
20 Regional Coordination Centers under section
21 301.

22 (B) ORGANIZATIONS SPECIFIED.—The or-
23 ganizations referred to in subparagraph (A) are
24 the following:

1 (i) The OAS Inter-American Com-
2 mittee Against Terrorism (CICTE).

3 (ii) The OAS Inter-American Drug
4 Abuse Control Commission (CICAD).

5 **SEC. 109. AMENDMENT TO DEPARTMENT OF STATE RE-**
6 **WARDS PROGRAM.**

7 Section 36(b) of the State Department Basic Au-
8 thorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2708(b)) is amended—

9 (1) in paragraph (6), by striking “or” at the
10 end;

11 (2) in paragraph (7)(B), by striking the period
12 at the end and inserting “; or”; and

13 (3) by adding at the end the following new
14 paragraph:

15 “(8) the arrest or conviction in any country of
16 any individual wanted on terrorism charges pursuant
17 to red notices duly issued by Interpol, if such reward
18 would help advance United States interests or the
19 interests of United States allies in the global strug-
20 gle against international terrorism.”.

1 **TITLE II—NONPROLIFERATION**
2 **OF NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL,**
3 **AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS**
4 **IN THE WESTERN HEMI-**
5 **SPHERE**

6 **SEC. 201. FINDINGS.**

7 Congress finds the following:

8 (1) Venezuela and Iran have established exten-
9 sive political, military, and economic cooperation.

10 (2) Venezuela, under the government of Hugo
11 Chavez, has publicly supported Iran's development
12 of a capacity to enrich uranium, which many observ-
13 ers believe is part of a nuclear weapons program.

14 (3) In May 2005, Chavez stated that he was
15 seeking assistance from Iran to establish a nuclear
16 program in Venezuela.

17 (4) On February 4, 2006, Venezuela was one of
18 only three countries to vote against a resolution by
19 the Board of Governors of the International Atomic
20 Energy Agency, or IAEA, to report Iran to the
21 United Nations Security Council for violating its ob-
22 ligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Trea-
23 ty.

24 (5) On February 15, 2006, the Speaker of the
25 Iranian parliament, Gholam Ali Haddad-Adel, stated

1 that his government was prepared to discuss pro-
2 viding technical assistance to a Venezuelan nuclear
3 program.

4 (6) On a visit to Iran in February 2008, Abel
5 El Zabayar, a member of Venezuela’s National As-
6 sembly and Mining Commission, stated that Iran
7 will “practically give away” its civilian nuclear tech-
8 nology and that “if relations with Iran lead to shar-
9 ing nuclear technology with us, we would then give
10 it away to our brothers in Latin America once we
11 are successful.”.

12 (7) El Zabayar stated that Venezuela had taken
13 steps toward establishing a civilian nuclear program
14 and that cooperation in this area was being dis-
15 cussed with the Governments of Iran and Belarus.

16 (8) Venezuela reportedly has large deposits of
17 uranium ore in the Guiana Shield region.

18 (9) In 1985 the Brazilian government an-
19 nounced that it had terminated a clandestine nuclear
20 weapons program run by the military since 1975.

21 (10) In August 2005 a former high-ranking
22 Brazilian nuclear official stated that the military
23 had continued to develop elements of a nuclear
24 weapons program into the 1990s.

1 (11) On November 20, 2007, Brazilian General
2 Jose Benedito de Barros Moreira publicly called for
3 Brazil to develop the technological capacity to manu-
4 facture nuclear weapons.

5 (12) The centrifuges at Brazil's Resende ura-
6 nium enrichment plant can be reconfigured to
7 produce highly enriched uranium in quantities suffi-
8 cient to produce several nuclear weapons annually.

9 (13) Brazil has denied inspectors from the
10 IAEA full access to its uranium enrichment cen-
11 trifuges at Resende on the grounds that it is pro-
12 tecting commercial secrets.

13 (14) The standoff with the IAEA was resolved
14 only by the IAEA agreeing to limit its verification
15 methods to indirect inspections without direct in-
16 spection of the centrifuges, which many non-
17 proliferation experts fear could be used as a prece-
18 dent by Iran and other countries to prevent IAEA
19 inspectors from examining their suspect nuclear fa-
20 cilities.

21 (15) A prototype nuclear reactor is being devel-
22 oped at the Armar Research Center for use in Bra-
23 zil's nuclear-powered submarine program.

24 (16) On February 24, 2008, the Governments
25 of Argentina and Brazil agreed to begin negotiations

1 regarding the joint development of a nuclear reactor
2 and construction of a uranium enrichment plant.

3 (17) Until 1990 the Argentine Government con-
4 ducted a clandestine nuclear weapons program.

5 (18) In December 1985 Argentina and Iran
6 signed a nuclear cooperation agreement in which Ar-
7 gentina agreed to supply Iran with highly enriched
8 uranium.

9 (19) In 1987 and 1988 Argentina signed three
10 agreements with Iran for converting a nuclear reac-
11 tor to use enriched uranium, for building pilot plants
12 for uranium-dioxide conversion and fuel fabrication.

13 (20) Assistance by Argentina to the Iranian nu-
14 clear program was reduced, but not terminated, fol-
15 lowing pressure by the United States.

16 (21) Several countries in Latin America, includ-
17 ing Brazil and Argentina, have not signed and im-
18 plemented an Additional Protocol which provides
19 IAEA inspectors with enhanced access to nuclear fa-
20 cilities.

21 (22) Some Western Hemisphere countries have
22 not ratified the Convention on the Prohibition of the
23 Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
24 Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, also re-
25 ferred to as The Chemical Weapons Convention.

1 (23) Several countries in Latin America have
2 not signed and ratified The Convention on the Pro-
3 hibition of the Development and Stockpiling of Bac-
4 teriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on
5 Their Destruction, also referred to as The Biological
6 Convention.

7 **SEC. 202. STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING THE PRO-**
8 **LIFERATION OF WEAPONS-RELATED NU-**
9 **CLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL MATE-**
10 **RIALS, TECHNOLOGY, AND FACILITIES.**

11 (a) IN GENERAL.—To enhance the prevention of the
12 proliferation of weapons-related nuclear, chemical, and bi-
13 ological materials, technology, and facilities, it shall be the
14 policy of the United States to—

15 (1) promote the negotiation and implementation
16 by all countries of—

17 (A) a comprehensive safeguards agreement
18 with the International Atomic Energy Agency
19 (IAEA); and

20 (B) an Additional Protocol to the safe-
21 guards agreement;

22 (2) secure guarantees by all countries of unre-
23 stricted access by IAEA personnel to all nuclear-re-
24 lated materials and facilities in territories under the
25 control of the host country;

1 (3) promote the implementation by all countries
2 of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540;
3 and

4 (4) promote the accession to and ratification
5 and implementation of—

6 (A) the Convention on the Prohibition of
7 the Development, Production, Stockpiling and
8 Use of Chemical Weapons and on their De-
9 struction (also referred to as the Chemical
10 Weapons Convention);

11 (B) the 1980 IAEA Convention on the
12 Physical Protection of Nuclear Material;

13 (C) the 2005 United Nations International
14 Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nu-
15 clear Terrorism; and

16 (D) the Convention on the Prohibition of
17 the Development and Stockpiling of Bacterio-
18 logical (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on
19 their Destruction (also referred to as the Bio-
20 logical Weapons Convention).

21 (b) ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL DEFINED.—In this sec-
22 tion, the term “Additional Protocol” means the Protocol
23 Additional to an agreement between a country and the
24 International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application
25 of Safeguards.

1 **SEC. 203. STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING THE SMALL**
2 **QUANTITIES PROTOCOL.**

3 Because a Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) sets
4 aside many of the operative provisions of a general safe-
5 guards agreement, the ability of the IAEA to verify that
6 nuclear materials and facilities in a country with an SQP
7 are not being diverted for illicit purposes is significantly
8 impaired. For this reason, it shall be the policy of the
9 United States to—

10 (1) oppose the negotiation by the IAEA of an
11 SQP for any country that did not have an SQP as
12 of January 1, 2008; and

13 (2) encourage every country with an SQP to
14 withdraw formally from or renegotiate that agree-
15 ment for the purpose of increasing transparency and
16 eliminating any exemption or provision that could
17 restrict the ability of the IAEA to verify that a
18 country's nuclear materials and facilities are not
19 being diverted to impermissible uses.

20 **SEC. 204. SECURING ADHERENCE TO AGREEMENTS RE-**
21 **GARDING NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION BY**
22 **COUNTRIES IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE.**

23 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall use all avail-
24 able political, economic, and diplomatic tools to ensure
25 that each country in the Western Hemisphere—

1 (1) has signed and implemented a comprehen-
2 sive safeguards agreement with the IAEA;

3 (2) has signed and implemented an Additional
4 Protocol to its safeguards agreement;

5 (3) guarantees unrestricted access for IAEA
6 personnel to all nuclear-related facilities;

7 (4) has implemented the provisions of United
8 Nations Security Council Resolution 1540;

9 (5) has acceded to, ratified, and fully imple-
10 mented the conventions referred to in section
11 202(a)(4);

12 (6) does not negotiate with the IAEA an SQP
13 if that country did not have an SQP as of January
14 1, 2008; and

15 (7) withdraws formally from or renegotiates an
16 SQP agreement if a country has such an agreement.

17 (b) SANCTIONS.—For any Western Hemisphere
18 country that has not satisfied all of the requirements spec-
19 ified in subsection (a), the President is authorized to—

20 (1) suspend United States nonhumanitarian
21 foreign assistance to the government of that country;
22 and

23 (2) prohibit the sale, provision, or transfer of
24 articles, including the issuance of any specific license

1 or grant of any other specific permission or author-
2 ity to export any goods or technology under—

3 (A) the Export Administration Act of
4 1979;

5 (B) the Arms Export Control Act;

6 (C) the Atomic Energy Act of 1954; or

7 (D) any other statute that requires the
8 prior review and approval of the United States
9 Government as a condition for the export or re-
10 export of goods or services.

11 **SEC. 205. HALTING THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR**
12 **FUEL FABRICATION.**

13 (a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy
14 of the United States to oppose the development or acquisi-
15 tion by any country of a capacity to fabricate nuclear fuel
16 if such country did not have such capacity as of January
17 1, 2008.

18 (b) PREVENTION OF CAPACITY TO FABRICATE NU-
19 CLEAR FUEL.—The President shall use all available polit-
20 ical, economic, and diplomatic tools, and shall use the
21 voice, vote, and influence of the United States in all inter-
22 national organizations and associations of which it is a
23 member, including the IAEA and the Nuclear Suppliers
24 Group, to prevent the development or acquisition by any

1 country of a capacity to fabricate nuclear fuel if such
2 country did not have such capacity as of January 1, 2008.

3 (c) NUCLEAR TECHNICAL COOPERATION WITH THE
4 IAEA.—The President shall direct the United States Per-
5 manent Representative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote,
6 and influence of the United States at the IAEA to block
7 the allocation of funds for any IAEA development, envi-
8 ronmental, or nuclear science assistance or activity to a
9 country the government of which—

10 (1) the Secretary of State has determined, for
11 purposes of section 6(j) of the Export Administra-
12 tion Act of 1979, section 620A of the Foreign As-
13 sistance Act of 1961, section 40 of the Arms Export
14 Control Act, or other provision of law, is a govern-
15 ment that has repeatedly provided support for acts
16 of international terrorism;

17 (2) is actively cooperating with a government as
18 described in paragraph (1);

19 (3) is under investigation for a breach of or
20 noncompliance with its IAEA obligations or the pur-
21 poses and principles of the Charter of the United
22 Nations; or

23 (4) is in violation of its IAEA obligations or the
24 purposes and principles of the Charter of the United
25 Nations.

1 **SEC. 206. COOPERATION WITH THE PROLIFERATION SECU-**
2 **RITY INITIATIVE.**

3 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

4 (1) From its inception on May 31, 2003, the
5 Proliferation Security Initiative, also referred to as
6 the PSI, has repeatedly demonstrated its effective-
7 ness in preventing the proliferation of weapons of
8 mass destruction.

9 (2) In his February 11, 2004, address at the
10 National Defense University regarding additional
11 measures to enhance global efforts against the pro-
12 liferation of weapons of mass destruction President
13 Bush proposed that “the work of the Proliferation
14 Security Initiative be expanded to address more than
15 shipments and transfers. Building on the tools we’ve
16 developed to fight terrorists, we can take direct ac-
17 tion against proliferation networks. We need greater
18 cooperation not just among intelligence and military
19 services, but in law enforcement, as well. PSI par-
20 ticipants and other willing nations should use the
21 Interpol and all other means to bring to justice
22 those who traffic in deadly weapons, to shut down
23 their labs, to seize their materials, to freeze their as-
24 sets. We must act on every lead. We will find the
25 middlemen, the suppliers and the buyers.”.

1 (3) The number of countries participating in
2 PSI has steadily increased, thereby greatly enhanc-
3 ing its effectiveness.

4 (4) Many countries in the Western Hemisphere
5 formally or informally cooperate with the PSI.

6 (5) Expanded law enforcement cooperation
7 throughout the Western Hemisphere, including by
8 means of greater coordination of policies, improved
9 communications, and enhanced capabilities would
10 significantly promote the objectives of the PSI.

11 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS CONCERNING STRENGTH-
12 ENING COOPERATION REGARDING NONPROLIFERA-
13 TION.—It is the sense of Congress that—

14 (1) it is in the national security interest of the
15 United States to establish comprehensive coopera-
16 tion to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical,
17 and biological materials in the Western Hemisphere;
18 and

19 (2) the Secretary of State should seek to secure
20 the formal or informal cooperation by Western
21 Hemisphere countries for the purpose of securing
22 the goals of the Proliferation Security Initiative an-
23 nounced by the President on May 31, 2003.

1 **SEC. 207. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE**
2 **NONPROLIFERATION PARTNERSHIP INITIA-**
3 **TIVE.**

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State is author-
5 ized, in consultation with relevant United States Govern-
6 ment agencies, to negotiate with the leaders of the govern-
7 ments of countries in the Western Hemisphere on a bilat-
8 eral or multilateral basis, as appropriate, international
9 agreements under which such governments work in part-
10 nership to establish an initiative to be known as the
11 “Western Hemisphere Nonproliferation Partnership Ini-
12 tiative” (NPI).

13 (b) PURPOSE.—

14 (1) IN GENERAL.—The NPI shall—

15 (A) encourage the establishment of con-
16 tacts and cooperative relationships, including
17 the sharing of intelligence, between the respon-
18 sible individuals and agencies of each partici-
19 pant country with their counterparts in the
20 United States Government and in other partici-
21 pating countries; and

22 (B) encourage bilateral and multilateral
23 support, cooperation, and coordination of na-
24 tional programs and efforts to promote effective
25 and in-depth cooperation to counter the illicit
26 acquisition or trade of weapons-related nuclear,

1 chemical, or biological materials, technology, or
2 facilities.

3 (2) COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS.—The cooperative
4 programs referred to under paragraph (1)(B) shall
5 include the following:

6 (A) Training for government officials and
7 agents from participating countries regarding
8 the development and operation of NPI pro-
9 grams.

10 (B) Assistance in developing a comprehen-
11 sive legal and regulatory framework in each
12 country, as appropriate, to enable the establish-
13 ment and effective implementation of export
14 controls and the capacity to track nuclear,
15 chemical, and biological materials, equipment,
16 technology, and facilities.

17 (C) Provision of equipment, development of
18 infrastructure, and the acquisition of other re-
19 sources required by participating countries to
20 effectively carry out the tasks referred to in
21 subparagraphs (A) and (B).

22 **SEC. 208. PROHIBITED TRANSACTIONS.**

23 (a) IN GENERAL.—No defense article or defense serv-
24 ice may be sold or licensed for export under this Act in
25 a fiscal year to a foreign country that the President deter-

1 mines and certifies to Congress, not later than May 15
2 of the calendar year in which such fiscal year begins, is
3 carrying out policies aimed at undermining United States
4 national security interests or is not cooperating fully with
5 United States nonproliferation efforts.

6 (b) WAIVER.—The President may waive the prohibi-
7 tion under subsection (a) with respect to a specific trans-
8 action if the President determines that such transaction
9 is important to the national security interests of the
10 United States.

11 **SEC. 209. RESTRICTIONS ON NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH**
12 **COUNTRIES ASSISTING THE NUCLEAR PRO-**
13 **GRAM OF VENEZUELA OR CUBA.**

14 (a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provi-
15 sion of law or any international agreement, no agreement
16 for cooperation between the United States and the govern-
17 ment of any country that is assisting the nuclear program
18 of Venezuela or Cuba or transferring advanced conven-
19 tional weapons or missiles to Venezuela or Cuba may be
20 submitted to the President or to Congress pursuant to sec-
21 tion 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C.
22 2153), no such agreement may enter into force with such
23 country, no license may be issued for export directly or
24 indirectly to such country of any nuclear material, facili-
25 ties, components, or other goods, services, or technology

1 that would be subject to such agreement, and no approval
 2 may be given for the transfer or retransfer directly or indi-
 3 rectly to such country of any nuclear material, facilities,
 4 components, or other goods, services, or technology that
 5 would be subject to such agreement, until the President
 6 determines and reports to the Committee on Foreign Af-
 7 fairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee
 8 on Foreign Relations of the Senate that the government
 9 of the country that is assisting the nuclear program of
 10 Venezuela or Cuba or transferring advanced conventional
 11 weapons or missiles to Venezuela or Cuba—

12 (1) has suspended all nuclear assistance to Ven-
 13 ezuela or Cuba and all transfers of advanced conven-
 14 tional weapons and missiles to Venezuela or Cuba;
 15 and

16 (2) is committed to maintaining such suspen-
 17 sion until Venezuela or Cuba has implemented meas-
 18 ures that would permit the President to make the
 19 determination described in paragraph (1).

20 (b) RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.—The restrictions de-
 21 scribed in subsection (a)—

22 (1) shall apply in addition to all other applica-
 23 ble procedures, requirements, and restrictions re-
 24 quired by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and any
 25 other law; and

1 (2) shall not be construed as affecting the valid-
2 ity of agreements for cooperation that are in effect
3 on the date of the enactment of this Act.

4 (c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

5 (1) AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION.—The term
6 “agreement for cooperation” has the meaning given
7 that term in section 11 b. of the Atomic Energy Act
8 of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014 b.).

9 (2) ASSISTING THE NUCLEAR PROGRAM OF
10 VENEZUELA OR CUBA.—The term “assisting the nu-
11 clear program of Venezuela or Cuba” means the in-
12 tentional transfer to Venezuela or Cuba by a govern-
13 ment, or by a person subject to the jurisdiction of
14 a government with the knowledge and acquiescence
15 of such government, of goods, services, or technology
16 listed on the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines for
17 the Export of Nuclear Material, Equipment and
18 Technology (published by the International Atomic
19 Energy Agency as Information Circular INFCIRC/
20 254/Rev. 3/Part 1, and subsequent revisions) or
21 Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-
22 Use Equipment, Material, and Related Technology
23 (published by the International Atomic Energy
24 Agency as Information Circular INFCIR/254/Rev. 3/
25 Part 2, and subsequent revisions).

1 (3) COUNTRY THAT IS ASSISTING THE NU-
2 CLEAR PROGRAM OF VENEZUELA OR CUBA OR
3 TRANSFERRING ADVANCED CONVENTIONAL WEAP-
4 ONS OR MISSILES TO VENEZUELA OR CUBA.—The
5 term “country that is assisting the nuclear program
6 of Venezuela or Cuba or transferring advanced con-
7 ventional weapons or missiles to Venezuela or Cuba”
8 means—

9 (A) Russia; and

10 (B) any other country determined by the
11 President to be assisting the nuclear program
12 of Venezuela or Cuba or transferring advanced
13 conventional weapons or missiles to Venezuela
14 or Cuba.

15 (4) TRANSFERRING ADVANCED CONVENTIONAL
16 WEAPONS OR MISSILES TO VENEZUELA OR CUBA.—
17 The term “transferring advanced conventional weap-
18 ons or missiles to Venezuela or Cuba” means the in-
19 tentional transfer to Venezuela or Cuba by a govern-
20 ment, or by a person subject to the jurisdiction of
21 a government with the knowledge and acquiescence
22 of such government, of goods, services, or technology
23 listed on—

24 (A) the Wassenaar Arrangement list of
25 Dual Use Goods and Technologies and Muni-

1 tions list of July 12, 1996, and subsequent revi-
2 sions; or

3 (B) the Missile Technology Control Regime
4 Equipment and Technology Annex of June 11,
5 1996, and subsequent revisions.

6 **TITLE III—WESTERN HEMI-**
7 **SPHERE REGIONAL COORDI-**
8 **NATION CENTERS**

9 **SEC. 301. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE**
10 **REGIONAL COORDINATION CENTERS.**

11 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
12 gress that—

13 (1) the United States Government should carry
14 out a comprehensive and integrated approach to
15 United States counterterrorism and nonproliferation
16 efforts, both domestically and abroad; and

17 (2) the Secretary of State should seek to en-
18 gage leaders of the governments of countries in the
19 Western Hemisphere to develop a comprehensive
20 multilateral strategy to counter current and emerg-
21 ing threats and prevent the proliferation of nuclear,
22 chemical, and biological weapons.

23 (b) PURPOSE.—Western Hemisphere Regional Co-
24 ordination Centers shall serve as joint operational facilities
25 dedicated to coordinating efforts, capacity, and intel-

1 ligence among participating countries to counter current
2 and emerging threats and prevent the proliferation of nu-
3 clear, chemical, and biological weapons throughout the
4 Western Hemisphere.

5 (c) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary of State shall
6 negotiate with the leaders of the governments of countries
7 in the Western Hemisphere on a bilateral or multilateral
8 basis, as appropriate, international agreements under
9 which such governments work in partnership to establish
10 centers to be known as the “Western Hemisphere Regional
11 Coordination Centers” (RCC).

12 (d) COOPERATION WITH GOVERNMENTS IN THE
13 WESTERN HEMISPHERE.—

14 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall
15 negotiate with—

16 (A) the governments of countries in Cen-
17 tral and South America agreements for the es-
18 tablishment of one RCC in a country in Central
19 America and one RCC in a country in South
20 America; and

21 (B) the Government of Brazil, the Govern-
22 ment of Argentina, and the Government of
23 Paraguay an agreement for the establishment
24 of a RCC specifically in the tri-border area.

1 (2) COORDINATION.—The Secretary of State
2 shall negotiate with the leaders of the governments
3 of countries in the Western Hemisphere on a bilat-
4 eral or multilateral basis, as appropriate, agreements
5 under which a method is established for staffing par-
6 allel representatives, from each participating country
7 or region, for each United States agency represented
8 at the relevant RCC.

9 (e) PARTICIPATION OF UNITED STATES GOVERN-
10 MENT AGENCIES.—

11 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in
12 consultation with the Director of National Intel-
13 ligence and the Secretary of Defense, shall deter-
14 mine which departments and agencies of the United
15 States Government, including the Department of
16 Defense, the Department of Energy, the Department
17 of Homeland Security, the Department of the Treas-
18 ury, the Department of Justice, the Drug Enforce-
19 ment Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
20 tion, are necessary to ensure the establishment and
21 operation of the RCCs. The Secretary of State, in
22 consultation with the Director of National Intel-
23 ligence and the Secretary of Defense, shall negotiate
24 agreements with the heads of such agencies to en-

1 sure their full participation and cooperation in such
2 establishment and operation.

3 (2) ASSIGNMENT OF REGIONAL ATTACHES AND
4 ADVISORS.—The Secretary of State shall transfer to
5 appropriate RCCs regional attaches and advisors
6 serving at United States diplomatic and consular
7 missions in the Western Hemisphere.

8 (f) STRUCTURE.—

9 (1) MANAGEMENT OF THE RCCS.—The Sec-
10 retary of State, in consultation with the Director of
11 National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense,
12 shall be responsible for the management of the
13 RCCs, including development of the budget, prior-
14 ities, and programs of the RCCs.

15 (2) STAFFING AND DUTIES.—Each RCC shall
16 have one United States Director, at least one but
17 not more than two United States Deputy Directors,
18 and one host country General Director. The United
19 States Director and United States Deputy Directors
20 may be employees of any of the United States na-
21 tional security agencies and shall be chosen by the
22 Secretary of State, in consultation with the Director
23 of National Intelligence and Secretary of Defense.
24 The Director and Deputy Directors of each RCC
25 shall keep the Chief of Mission of the United States

1 Embassies in the host country of such RCC fully in-
2 formed of activities and operations of such RCC.

3 (3) RCC POLICY BOARD.—

4 (A) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is estab-
5 lished the RCC Policy Board.

6 (B) COMPOSITION.—The RCC Policy
7 Board shall be comprised of senior representa-
8 tives from the departments and agencies deter-
9 mined by the Secretary of State, in consultation
10 with the Director of National Intelligence and
11 the Secretary of Defense, to be necessary to en-
12 sure the establishment and operation of the
13 RCCs in accordance with subsection (e).

14 (C) DUTIES.—The Policy Board shall
15 monitor and provide guidance and oversight for
16 the RCCs to ensure that their operations are
17 consistent with United States foreign policy and
18 law enforcement goals.

19 (D) MEETINGS.—The Policy Board shall
20 meet bi-monthly and shall be co-chaired by offi-
21 cers from the Office of the Coordinator for
22 Counterterrorism of the Department of State
23 and the National Counterterrorism Center of
24 the Office of the Director of National Intel-
25 ligence.

1 **SEC. 302. REGIONAL SECURITY INITIATIVE.**

2 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
3 gress that the Latin America Regional Strategic Initiative
4 (RSI) should serve as a critical component of United
5 States regional counterterrorism and nonproliferation ef-
6 forts.

7 (b) PARTICIPATION WITH THE RCCS.—The Latin
8 America RSI shall conduct at least one inter-agency meet-
9 ing at one of the three RCCs each fiscal year. The Direc-
10 tor, a Deputy Director, or both, of each RCC shall partici-
11 pate in all RSI meetings organized by the Department of
12 State.

13 (c) REPORT.—Not later than 45 days after the con-
14 clusion of each RSI meeting, the Secretary of State shall
15 submit to the appropriate congressional committees a re-
16 port, which shall include a classified annex if necessary,
17 that describes—

18 (1) the defined objectives of the RSI;

19 (2) the extent to which such objectives have
20 been achieved;

21 (3) the steps taken by the United States to ac-
22 complish such objectives;

23 (4) the extent of cooperation by other countries
24 in the Western Hemisphere toward achieving such
25 objectives; and

1 (5) the steps the United States will take in the
2 subsequent months to accomplish such objectives.

3 **SEC. 303. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**

4 There is authorized to be appropriated such sums as
5 may be necessary for fiscal year 2009 and each subsequent
6 fiscal year to carry out this title.

7 **TITLE IV—PROHIBITIONS ON EN-**
8 **GAGEMENT WITH CERTAIN**
9 **WESTERN HEMISPHERE**
10 **COUNTRIES**

11 **SEC. 401. PROHIBITIONS ON ENGAGEMENT WITH CERTAIN**
12 **WESTERN HEMISPHERE COUNTRIES.**

13 Nothing in this Act shall be construed as weakening
14 or removing any prohibitions on United States engage-
15 ment with or assistance to any country in the Western
16 Hemisphere that the Secretary of State has designated as
17 a state sponsor of terrorism for a minimum of three con-
18 secutive years.

19 **TITLE V—REPORT**

20 **SEC. 501. REPORT.**

21 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year after the
22 date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter,
23 the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate con-
24 gressional committees a report on the activities carried out

1 to achieve the objectives described in titles II and III that
2 describe—

3 (1) the extent to which each such objective has
4 been achieved;

5 (2) the steps taken by the United States and
6 countries in the Western Hemisphere in the pre-
7 ceding calendar year to accomplish such objectives;

8 (3) the extent of cooperation by other countries
9 in the Western Hemisphere toward achieving such
10 objectives; and

11 (4) the steps the United States will take in the
12 current calendar year to accomplish such objectives.

13 (b) PREPARATION AND FORM OF REPORT.—The re-
14 port required under subsection (a) shall rely on public in-
15 formation to the extent possible, and shall include a classi-
16 fied annex, if necessary.

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